20 Muslim countries object Israel recognition of Somaliland as voices rising along suggestions such as moving the gazans to the new African country. The objection of the uma did not eco as loud as the Israeli recognition, as Somaliland citizens lit up they're city squares with the iconic Zionist blue and white decorations and lights. Will the gazans have a new home? Will Somaliland become Israel's cuba in the war against yeman? Well... None can really tell, but israel's involvement and investment in africa show's that the little Jewish country is on it agin! While war tare Africa israel is taking a stand with the more "democratic" factor on the board and the Muslim brotherhood smells trouble.

​The brain needs proof that the new paradigm works. ​Small steps👟: Don’t try to change everything at once. Conduct a small “experiment” that proves the new way is possible. ​Celebrating Success🎊: A small success in the new approach weakens the grip of the old paradigm. ​Thought 🌦: Breaking a paradigm is a painful process because it shakes our sense of security. It takes intellectual courage to admit that what we believed in is no longer relevant

The fall of the Iranian regime makes me rather emotional. Here we have this evil, datardardly, oppressive regime that has been a fixture since I was a toddler. And it's crumbling in front of us. May God help the Iranians finish the job of overthrowing the Islamic occupiers. The courage of so many Iranians is inspiring.

Body-count asymmetry is morally indeterminate. Higher civilian deaths on one side do not, by themselves, establish: - unjust intent, - disproportionate force, - or moral equivalence / non-equivalence. They often reflect variables like population density, defensive strategy, evacuation capacity, media access, or who is fighting from among civilians. Outcome-based morality doesn’t map onto causation. Moral responsibility in war—if it’s to mean anything—has to track choices under constraint, not raw outcomes abstracted from context. “More dead civilians” does not equal “more immoral” unless you smuggle in assumptions you haven’t defended: - that both sides had comparable alternatives, - that harm-minimization costs were symmetrical, - or that intent and foreseeability are irrelevant. Most public discourse quietly assumes all three and then treats the conclusion as self-evident. Structural inevitability forces a shift in moral vocabulary. If civilian harm cannot be reduced below a certain floor without abandoning the war aim entirely, then: - either the war itself is judged illegitimate as such, - or civilian harm must be assessed relative to necessity, alternatives, and responsibility for the structure of the battlefield—not as an absolute metric. What makes Gaza so morally destabilizing for modern observers is that it exposes a contradiction we’d rather not face: we want wars of annihilation against enemies we define as existential, while also wanting zero civilian blood guilt. History suggests you don’t get both. Ancient societies were brutally honest about this; early modern ones could occasionally finesse it; modern humanitarian language tries to deny it altogether. That denial produces moral claims that feel profound but dissolve under scrutiny—because they rely on numbers standing in for judgment. So it's not that civilian deaths “don’t matter.” It’s that they don’t mean what people insist they mean, absent a serious accounting of structure, strategy, and constraint. And once you take those seriously, a lot of confident moral posturing turns out to be empty.