For decades the West told itself a comforting story. If China were welcomed into the global economy and given access to investment, technology, manufacturing and international markets it would eventually become more democratic and more liberal. Trade would soften ideology and prosperity would naturally lead to freedom.
I believe this was one of the greatest strategic mistakes the West has made since the end of the Cold War.
The mistake was assuming that every nation views the world through the same liberal lens. Western leaders believed that economic development would inevitably produce political openness. China's leadership never shared that assumption. For Beijing economic growth was never a path to liberal democracy. It was a tool for building national power.
Anyone familiar with the history of Communist China should have questioned this belief from the beginning. Mao Zedong presided over one of the most brutal regimes in human history. His economic policies triggered catastrophic famine that killed tens of millions of people. Millions more were persecuted during the Cultural Revolution while the Communist Party built a system of almost total control over society.
This was never a temporary deviation. It was part of the regime's political DNA.
When Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger opened the door to China in the 1970s there was a clear strategic logic behind the decision. The goal was to exploit the growing split between China and the Soviet Union and weaken Moscow. It was a balance of power strategy rather than an ideological partnership.
Over time however American thinking changed.
Instead of viewing China as a temporary strategic partner against the Soviet Union many policymakers began to believe it would eventually become a natural member of the liberal international order. That was where the illusion truly began.
The West transferred massive industrial capacity to China. It shared advanced technology academic knowledge investment capital and entire manufacturing supply chains. It opened global markets supported China's entry into the World Trade Organization and provided access to unprecedented levels of Western capital.
China did not become more liberal.
It simply became richer.
That new wealth did not finance democracy. It strengthened the regime. It funded a modern military sophisticated digital surveillance systems industrial espionage expanding geopolitical influence and global infrastructure projects designed to increase other nations' dependence on Beijing.
This is where I believe Western thinking fundamentally failed. It assumed that economics would reshape ideology.
The opposite happened.
Ideology used economics to make itself stronger.
The rise of Xi Jinping did not mark a dramatic change in direction. It revealed what had always been there. Under his leadership China became more centralized more nationalistic and far more confident in pursuing its long-term ambitions. It no longer hides its intention to become the dominant global power of the twenty-first century.
That is why the relationship between the United States and China is no longer just a trade dispute.
It is a competition between two fundamentally different visions of the world. On one side stands a liberal democracy with all its imperfections. On the other stands an authoritarian state that sees economic power as a means of expanding political influence and military strength.
China is facing serious internal challenges including an aging population massive debt a troubled real estate sector and slower economic growth. Yet it would be a mistake to conclude that these problems have made China less of a strategic challenge. History shows that governments under growing internal pressure often become more assertive abroad.
Taiwan is the clearest example.
Beyond its historical significance Taiwan occupies a critical position in the global semiconductor industry. Any attempt by China to seize the island would have consequences far beyond East Asia. It would affect the global economy international security and the technological foundation of the modern world.
The lesson I draw from this story is remarkably simple.
Economic prosperity does not automatically produce ideological change. Nations do not abandon their core identity simply because they become wealthier. In many cases they use their new wealth to reinforce the very ideology the outside world expected them to abandon.
In the case of China it increasingly appears that the West did not transform China.
It helped create its most formidable strategic rival.
Adam Feder