The problem of Lebanon runs deeper than Hezbollah. Hezbollah may be the most potent and dangerous manifestation of the problem, but it did not create it. Lebanon was constructed as a political system composed of highly diverse religious and sectarian groups. For decades, attempts were made to balance them through power-sharing arrangements, political agreements, and sectarian mechanisms. Yet, a mechanism designed to maintain balance can also become the very mechanism that prevents stability. When different segments of the population hold such divergent visions regarding the state's identity, its loyalty, its place in the region, its relations with Israel, its relations with Iran, and—above all—the question of who is authorized to hold power, it becomes exceedingly difficult to forge a functioning nation-state in the accepted sense. Simply put, Lebanon often resembles a state built from materials that cannot coexist. This is not to claim that every Lebanese citizen is an enemy, or that the various religious groups in Lebanon are incapable of living in peace with one another. On the contrary, the issue lies in the political and demographic structure that has formed over the years, and how it translates into a struggle for power, identity, and sovereignty. Hezbollah illustrates this contradiction in its most extreme form. How can a sovereign state exist when a separate armed force operates within it—possessing its own ideology, organization, and military infrastructure—without necessarily accepting the absolute authority of the state? But here lies the tougher question. Even if Hezbollah were to disappear tomorrow, would Lebanon suddenly transform into a stable nation-state? There is no simple answer, because the problem is not merely the weaponry. It is the fundamental question of whether a broad enough consensus even exists among the diverse components of Lebanese society regarding what Lebanon is, and what it is meant to be. A normal state requires more than just a government.