Lebanon’s Broken Promise · Liberty Politics Discussion

Lebanon’s Broken Promise

The problem between Israel and Lebanon is not another ceasefire, another agreement, or another round of diplomatic negotiations. The deeper problem is that Lebanon has repeatedly demonstrated that its commitments mean very little when it comes time to enforce them. Agreements are signed, promises are made, international guarantees are announced, and then the same pattern returns: Hezbollah remains armed, Hezbollah continues operating from Lebanese territory, Lebanon fails to dismantle its military infrastructure, Israel eventually responds, and Beirut condemns Israel for responding.

That pattern is now repeating itself once again.

The latest fighting in southern Lebanon illustrates the problem perfectly. The June framework was supposed to establish a process in which Lebanese sovereignty would actually be restored. Non-state armed groups were supposed to be disarmed, their military infrastructure dismantled, and the Lebanese Armed Forces were supposed to assume effective control of Lebanese territory. Israeli withdrawal was connected to the implementation and verification of those obligations. Yet Hezbollah remains armed, its infrastructure remains, and the Lebanese state has still not demonstrated that it is capable of enforcing the central requirement of the agreement.

Then Hezbollah attacked Israeli forces.

Three Israeli soldiers were seriously wounded in a drone attack near the Ali al-Taher ridge, a strategically important area overlooking Nabatieh and the surrounding road network. Israel responded with strikes against Hezbollah targets, killing senior Hezbollah personnel as well as civilians who, according to Israel, were located inside a building being used for military purposes. The strikes were described as the deadliest Israeli attacks in Lebanon since the June ceasefire.

And once again, the Lebanese response followed the familiar script.

Instead of beginning with the obvious question — why is Hezbollah still armed and attacking Israel from Lebanese territory? — Lebanese leaders condemned Israel. The Lebanese president's office accused Israel of violating the framework and undermining the negotiation process. The Lebanese prime minister condemned the Israeli strikes. The original Hezbollah attack became secondary, while Israel's response became the central issue.

This is the fundamental inversion that Israel can no longer accept.

An armed organization attacks Israel from Lebanese territory. Israel responds. Lebanon condemns Israel. The international discussion then focuses on the Israeli response rather than on the armed organization that caused it. Hezbollah survives, its military infrastructure remains intact, and the entire cycle begins again.

This cannot be called a functioning security arrangement. It is a mechanism for transferring responsibility from the party that initiates the violence to the party that responds to it.

The Lebanese government cannot have it both ways. Lebanon wants to be recognized as a sovereign state, and Israel should have every interest in seeing a genuinely sovereign Lebanon emerge. But sovereignty has a meaning. A sovereign state is not simply a country with a flag, a president, a parliament and an army. A sovereign state is a state that controls the use of force within its territory.

That is precisely what Hezbollah prevents Lebanon from being.

Hezbollah is not a foreign army that accidentally happens to be operating inside Lebanon. Its members are Lebanese citizens. Its political representatives participate in Lebanese politics. Its military infrastructure is located in Lebanon. Its command structure operates from Lebanese territory, and its attacks against Israel are launched from that territory. If the Lebanese state allows this military structure to remain intact, it cannot simply demand that Israel treat Hezbollah as though it has nothing to do with Lebanon.

The issue here is not whether every Lebanese citizen supports Hezbollah. That is irrelevant to the question of state responsibility. The issue is the behavior of institutions.

The Lebanese Armed Forces are a hierarchical institution. They do not function as a collection of independent individuals, each free to decide for himself whether Hezbollah should be disarmed. The same is true of the Lebanese government. Responsibility belongs to institutions according to their authority, their chain of command and their actions.

If the Lebanese Armed Forces are responsible for restoring the state's monopoly over force, then they must actually restore it. If they cannot dismantle Hezbollah, Lebanon has a sovereignty problem. If they will not dismantle Hezbollah, Lebanon has a political problem. And if the Lebanese state cooperates with, facilitates or deliberately tolerates Hezbollah's continued military existence, then Israel has a security problem that cannot be solved by another document.

This is why the endless distinction between "Lebanon" and "Hezbollah" becomes increasingly artificial when discussing responsibility for attacks launched from Lebanese territory. Israel is not fighting an abstract organization floating somewhere outside the country. It is confronting a heavily armed military organization embedded in Lebanon and operating under the protection, tolerance or inability of Lebanese state institutions to control it.

The history of Lebanon reinforces the lesson. Israel has seen agreements, resolutions and international commitments repeatedly fail when confronted with armed organizations operating outside effective state control. The problem is therefore not that Israel refuses to believe in diplomacy. The problem is that diplomacy without enforcement provides no security.

A signature does not dismantle a missile depot. A presidential statement does not destroy a command center. An international resolution does not prevent a drone from being launched. Only actual enforcement can do that.

This is why Israel must stop treating Lebanese commitments as self-enforcing promises. Every agreement must be judged by measurable results. Is Hezbollah disarmed? Has its military infrastructure actually been dismantled? Does the Lebanese state control the territory? Can Hezbollah launch another attack from Lebanese soil? Are these facts independently verified?

If the answer is no, then the strategic reality has not changed.

The Lebanese army therefore faces a fundamental choice. If it wants to be recognized as the army of a sovereign Lebanon, it must act as the institution responsible for defending Lebanese sovereignty against every armed organization that challenges it. Its responsibility cannot simply be to protect Lebanon from Israel while allowing Hezbollah to maintain a parallel military power.

The real test of Lebanese sovereignty is not whether Lebanon can condemn Israel. It is whether Lebanon can control Hezbollah.

That is the point that repeatedly disappears from the international conversation.

Every time Hezbollah attacks, the same sequence begins. Hezbollah provokes. Israel responds. Beirut condemns Israel. International pressure is directed at Israel. Negotiations are revived. Another agreement is discussed. Hezbollah remains armed. And eventually the cycle begins again.

At some point, the question has to be asked: how many agreements can be violated before the agreements themselves become meaningless?

An agreement cannot function if only one side is expected to obey it. Israel cannot reasonably be expected to withdraw from territory while the armed organization that created the threat remains armed, entrenched and capable of launching another attack.

The solution is not complicated. If Lebanon wants Israeli forces to withdraw, Lebanon must establish genuine control over its territory. Hezbollah must be disarmed. Its military infrastructure must be dismantled. Attacks from Lebanese territory must be prevented. And these steps must be verified rather than merely promised.

Only then does Israeli withdrawal become a security measure rather than a gamble.

The most dangerous part of the current situation is therefore not simply the latest Israeli strike. It is the narrative that follows it. Hezbollah attacks. Israel responds. Lebanon condemns Israel. The international community debates Israeli proportionality. The original attack disappears from the center of the discussion.

That is how responsibility gets erased.

The question changes from "Why did Hezbollah attack?" to "Why did Israel respond?" Once that happens, the entire logic of deterrence is reversed. The attacker learns that the diplomatic cost will be transferred to the victim, while the victim learns that responding to an attack may generate greater international pressure than absorbing it.

Israel cannot accept that logic.

If the world genuinely wants fewer Israeli strikes in Lebanon, there is a straightforward way to achieve that. Remove the reason for the strikes. Disarm Hezbollah. Dismantle its military infrastructure. Prevent attacks from Lebanese territory. Establish genuine Lebanese control. Verify that the process has actually been completed.

Until that happens, asking Israel to trust another Lebanese promise is simply asking Israel to repeat a mistake it has already made too many times.

Lebanon cannot demand sovereignty only when Israel is being asked to withdraw. Sovereignty must also exist when Hezbollah is being asked to disarm. It cannot be invoked against Israel while being abandoned when Hezbollah violates Lebanon's own commitments.

Ultimately, Lebanon has to choose between two realities. Either Hezbollah is an independent armed power that the Lebanese state cannot control, in which case Lebanon must acknowledge that its sovereignty is incomplete. Or Lebanon is a sovereign state, in which case it must exercise sovereignty by dismantling the armed organization that maintains a military structure outside the state's control.

There is no stable third option in which Lebanon enjoys sovereignty, Hezbollah keeps its army, Israel withdraws, and everyone simply hopes that nothing happens.

That is not peace.

It is a countdown to the next war.

Israel should therefore judge Lebanon not by its declarations, signatures or diplomatic assurances, but by what actually happens on the ground. The questions are simple: Is Hezbollah disarmed? Is its military infrastructure dismantled? Does the Lebanese state control its territory? Can Hezbollah launch another attack from Lebanon?

Until the answers are clear, verified and irreversible, Israel has no rational basis for treating Lebanese promises as a substitute for Lebanese action.

The problem is not that Israel refuses to trust Lebanon.

The problem is that Lebanon keeps giving Israel reasons not to.

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Lebanon’s Broken Promise