@Mark Mulvey Output is from debt bot from the classroom Deed of Assignment vs Notice of Assignment — Rebuttal, Rights, and Lawful Entitlement What you have received from Cabot Financial (via their agent) is a standardised refusal script. It is carefully drafted to conflate data protection disclosure with proof of legal title. In law, those are entirely different questions. Below is the equitable and statutory checkmate. 1. Notice of Assignment (NOA) ≠ Deed of Assignment (DOA) A Notice of Assignment is merely a notification.A Deed of Assignment is the operative instrument that transfers legal title. Governing statute - Law of Property Act 1925, s.136 For a legal assignment, it must be: In writing Signed under the hand of the assignor Absolute (not by way of charge) Notice must then be given to the debtor A Notice cannot cure the absence of a valid deed. 2. Their claim “NOA is sufficient” is legally false Binding authority: - Van Lynn Developments Ltd v Pelias Construction Co Ltd [1969] 1 QB 607 (CA) - Promontoria (Oak) Ltd v Emanuel [2021] EWCA Civ 1682 - W F Harrison & Co Ltd v Burke [1956] 2 QB 454 (CA) Conclusion:NOA ≠ proof of ownership.NOA ≠ standing to sue.NOA ≠ authority to process data as “creditor”. 3. “Confidential between Cabot and the lender” — legally irrelevant This is a misdirection. You are not asking for commercial terms.You are asking for proof that legal title passed. Equity answers this clearly: Equity will not permit a statute to be used as an instrument of fraud. If Cabot asserts: - that it is the creditor, and - that it has standing to enforce, and - that it lawfully processes your data as owner then title is in issue, and title must be proven. They cannot rely on secrecy while simultaneously asserting ownership against you. 4. Why GDPR does NOT block disclosure Their GDPR argument collapses on inspection. Key points: - A Deed of Assignment does contain your personal data by reference: - UK GDPR Article 15(1)(c)You are entitled to know recipients of your personal data. - Article 5(1)(a) — lawfulness & transparencyProcessing as “creditor” requires lawful title. - ICO guidance confirms:

@Heather Lenehan Understood. Let us re-check this rigorously, step-by-step, applying the CPR internally as a court would, and stress-test whether the conclusion (mandatory set aside) is 100% correct. I will do this as if advising a District Judge, not a lay defendant. --- INTERNAL CPR AUDIT – WAS THIS JUDGMENT LAWFULLY ENTERED? We test this in the only correct order: 1. Was the judgment entered under CPR Part 12 (default judgment)? 2. If yes, were the CPR 12 pre-conditions satisfied at the moment judgment was entered? 3. If not, what is the mandatory procedural consequence? --- 1. What type of judgment is this? You say the order states: > “Judgment for Claimant (in default)” That phrase has a precise CPR meaning. 👉 It is not: summary judgment (CPR 24), strike-out judgment (CPR 3.4), judgment after trial. It is expressly CPR Part 12 default judgment. So CPR 12 governs validity. --- 2. CPR 12 – jurisdictional gateway (this is critical) CPR 12.3(1) > The claimant may obtain judgment in default only if: (a) the defendant has not filed an acknowledgment of service or a defence, and (b) the relevant time limit has expired. This is not discretionary. It is a jurisdictional condition precedent. --- 3. Apply CPR 12.3 to your procedural history Your facts (as stated): Defence filed ✔ Defence acknowledged by the court (15 August) ✔ Directions Questionnaire ordered ✔ Directions Questionnaire filed ✔ Once a defence is filed: > 🔒 CPR 12 is permanently closed unless the defence is later struck out There is no CPR mechanism by which a claimant can obtain default judgment after a defence exists, unless: the defence was struck out (CPR 3.4), or the defence was withdrawn, or the defence was never validly served. --- 4. Was the defence struck out? This is the only possible escape route for the judgment to be valid. Let’s test it. CPR 3.4 strike-out requires: an order striking out the defence, OR

@Rachel Spencer Very well. I will re-run the explanation expressly through Halsbury’s Laws of England, applying orthodox equity, trusts, and land registration doctrine, and separating legal title, beneficial ownership, and Land Registry machinery in the way a Chancery lawyer (or examiner) would expect. I will keep this authoritative, structured, and precise, but practical. --- Issue You have discovered that the registered proprietor’s name at HM Land Registry remains your maiden name. You wish to protect equity by trust and enter a restriction (RX1). The question is whether the register must be updated first, or whether the trust and restriction can lawfully proceed as matters stand. --- 1. The governing distinction in Halsbury: legal estate vs equitable ownership Halsbury is absolutely clear that English land law operates on a dual structure: Legal estate (visible on the register) Equitable / beneficial interest (enforced by equity) > “The legal estate may be vested in one person, while the beneficial interest belongs wholly or partly to another.” (Halsbury’s Laws of England, Equity / Trusts) This distinction is foundational and decisive. Consequence A trust: does not require alteration of the legal title to exist, and binds the legal estate in conscience, not by registration. --- 2. Effect of a change of name in English law (Halsbury: Persons & Property) Halsbury states the orthodox rule: > A person does not cease to be the same legal person merely because they change their name. Marriage and change of surname: do not create a new legal identity do not divest ownership do not require re-registration to preserve title The registered proprietor remains the same natural person, notwithstanding the continued use of a former name on the register. Consequence Your maiden name on the register is legally sufficient to support: a declaration of trust, and an application for a restriction --- 3. Declaration of trust over land (Halsbury: Trusts & Equity)

@Anive Hussain Please share some more detilas

@Dave DimeBar got it yet?