Bayesianism, Problem of Evil, and Defeat Condition.

I’m kinda new to Bayesianism and the defeat condition, so I’d like to know if I’m kinda on the right track with my thoughts here or if there’s something I’m missing…

When the atheist presents the problem of evil, couldn’t that just be used as evidence for something like a defeat condition more than it can be for atheism? Like God is an agent who is aware of things like the defeat condition, so he’d take into account things like the problem of evil in order to change how he orders the world. So if the atheist is right about animal suffering, God would just create an afterlife for the animals. Why would this decrease the probability of theism rather than merely making the defeat condition sub theory of theism closer to the probability of theism simpliciter? Like this is more evidence for a particular aciology than it is for atheism. So as long as the theist has a plausible explanation for Gid allowing evil, the atheist’s argument is rendered useless. This is basically just the logical problem of evil where the theist just has to offer a possible explanation. The atheist would have to show that the probability of that explanation is importable given theism. The theist could run the same problem of evil to show that their theodicy is highly probable, given theism, rather than atheism being more probable, given suffering.

Am i misunderstanding how Bayesianism works or something?

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