I’m kinda new to Bayesianism and the defeat condition, so I’d like to know if I’m kinda on the right track with my thoughts here or if there’s something I’m missing… When the atheist presents the problem of evil, couldn’t that just be used as evidence for something like a defeat condition more than it can be for atheism? Like God is an agent who is aware of things like the defeat condition, so he’d take into account things like the problem of evil in order to change how he orders the world. So if the atheist is right about animal suffering, God would just create an afterlife for the animals. Why would this decrease the probability of theism rather than merely making the defeat condition sub theory of theism closer to the probability of theism simpliciter? Like this is more evidence for a particular aciology than it is for atheism. So as long as the theist has a plausible explanation for Gid allowing evil, the atheist’s argument is rendered useless. This is basically just the logical problem of evil where the theist just has to offer a possible explanation. The atheist would have to show that the probability of that explanation is importable given theism. The theist could run the same problem of evil to show that their theodicy is highly probable, given theism, rather than atheism being more probable, given suffering. Am i misunderstanding how Bayesianism works or something?

What is your favorite kinds of arguments for God?

Hey all, I have a quick interactive for you all: Who is currently your favorite theistic philosopher? Don't have one? All good! What theistic philosopher has impacted your journey thus far then? Comment below 👇

Here’s an idea that I’ve came to on my own… wondering what everyone’s thoughts are. A common response to fine tuning arguments is that the constants are necessary. The way I’ve always dealt with it is to point out that nomological necessity isn’t really the important question. In a sense, every aspect of nature is nomologically necessary as it’s simply describing nature. If it were different, it wouldn’t be the same nature at hand. So, the more important question is whether it’s metaphysically (or even epistemologically) possible. There’s no reason to say that there can be a contradiction drawn from saying that a different universe with different properties could have existed in the place of our universe from the beginning. So even if there is physical necessity, it doesn’t change the heart of the argument the constants COULD have been different both in as far as the limits of our knowledge is concerned and what i (and I’d suggest you) should believe about the nature of reality. A different universe with different constants could have existed. There’s no reason to say that any particular value change in the constants contradict how reality itself operates. So, I argue, the necessity response is a non-starter or a cleverly disguise red herring. (Maybe this is obvious and I’ve just been oblivious to other’s making this case 🤷‍♂️) If you have any disagreements or input… conversation is welcome

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