We’ve got some exciting things in the works at IPA. This week we’re beginning development on a brand-new course covering Bayesian Epistemology and Rational Belief Formation alongside one of the leading scholars in the world working in this area. The goal isn’t just to teach Bayes’ Theorem. We want to help you understand how rational belief revision actually works, how evidence affects probability, how cumulative cases are built, and how these principles apply to questions about Christianity, history, miracles, science, and everyday reasoning. We’re also going to be building practical tools alongside the course, including: 📊 A Bayes Calculator 📈 Evidence-weighting tools 🧠 Interactive probability visualizations 🔬 Resources to help you apply Bayesian reasoning to real-world arguments and evidence If you had a chance to learn a topic with us: what topic? And what scholars would you want to hear from?

Hey, everyone. A couple days ago, I decided to start reading The Existence of God. Chapter 1 was pretty easy to comprehend and keep all the concepts straight in my mind, but once I got to chapter 2 where there are sections on both scientific and personal explanations, keeping track of all the definitions started to get really difficult, and I felt like I was highlighting multiple things on every page. If you've gone through the book, could you please offer some advice on how to get through it without feeling overwhelmed, yet being able to retain all the very specific, intricate definitions that Swinburne stipulates for the various types of explanations? Additionally, I'm in the section on personal explanations where he mentions Davidson's account of personal explanations in terms of scientific explanations, and I'm not seeing how his argument goes through for a non-reductionist/broadly dualist view of personal explanation that involves intention. From what I understand, he's saying that Davidson is including intentions themselves as reducible to combinations of brain states and their connections to the rest of one's body, correct? If so, it seems that Swinburne then says that intention is not reducible to brain states and their connections to one's body by this analogy: there are properties like redness that are immediately perceivable, but one does not need to know anything about the perceived object with the property of redness reflecting a particular wavelength that corresponds to the color red. So analogous to the case above, one does not need to know about a one's particular brain state and its connections to know what one's own intention is. Is this just how a typical argument for, at the least, property dualism is made?