I think Tim has put out a video on monotheism that references some of the works that Dr. Joshua Sijuwade had mentioned as being the "most fundamental person". In Than's new video "The Two Powers in Heaven" (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lzaOyXcon4s) There is an observation of the Greek New Testament, specifically the Substantival versus the Masoretic, in Daniel 7:13. The Substantival translation muddles the distinction between the Son and the Ancient of Days through a theological interpretation rather than a scribal error, in an attempt to preserve the idea of monotheism. It seems like "Angel Veneration and Christology" by Loren T Stuckenbruck isn't using the same definition of "monotheism" but rather the "one true God". These philosophical and theological categories we're using now don't map onto these older understandings. I think that makes it difficult to deploy as an argument in a way that is not just a theory, because there could be contending theories. For example, it was a scribal error, or they weren't seen as two persons but may be one person in different forms like in modalism. @Than Christopoulos Would love your input here as these differences in understanding of "monotheism" throughout time and its implications in apologetic work and argument deployment needs some clarity.

Happy Monday 🔥🔥 I want to kick us off this week with a good ol' interactive. What is everyone currently studying? Drop it in the comments 👇

Let’s say a Muslim asks “how many gods died on the cross?” It seems like every obvious answer seems to land you in heresy: Say “one” and it sounds like you’re either claiming the Father suffered (patripassianism) or that there are multiple gods and one of them died (tritheism). Say “zero” and you’ve denied that God truly died for humanity. Say “the Trinity died” and you’ve collapsed the distinction between the persons. The model of Conciliar Trinitarianism dissolves the puzzle through a careful equivocation on the word “God.” Predicatively, “God” works like a descriptor, it applies to anything that exemplifies the divine nature. In this sense, the Father, the Son, and the Spirit are each “God,” because each exemplifies the one divinity-attribute. Nominally, “God” works as a proper name, and it refers to one entity alone: the Father, who is the unsourced source of the Son and the Spirit. There is exactly one “God” in this sense. With this distinction in hand, the crucifixion question splits in two: Nominally: zero gods died. The one God, the Father, did not suffer or die. Patripassianism is avoided. Predicatively: one entity that is “God” died. The Son, who genuinely exemplifies divinity, truly died on the cross. The reality of the incarnation and atonement is preserved. Without the equivocation, you’re trapped. Univocal use of “God” forces you to either deny the Son’s death, implicate the Father in suffering, or count multiple gods. The two-sense distinction lets you affirm what orthodoxy requires: the one God (the Father) did not die, and God (the Son, predicatively) genuinely did. This way, monotheism stays intact and the persons stay distinct. Thus, the Christian is not forced to take on unwanted consequences.

With the recent restructuring, the path to getting the most out of this community is clearer than ever. Here’s how to make it work for you: Rewatch live recordings. Go back through past group calls and lectures 2–3 times. Repetition is where the lessons actually stick. Use the 2-hour group calls intentionally. Make it a habit to bring every knowledge gap you have into these calls and get them addressed in real time. That’s what they’re built for. Revisit older posts and take notes. The archives are full of insights. Treat them like a library, not a feed. DM me directly. If you need specific advice, resources, or guidance tailored to where you’re at, my inbox is open. Show up to study groups. Consistent attendance accelerates progress in ways solo work can’t replicate. Link with other members. Put your heads together, work through challenges collaboratively, and learn from each other’s perspectives. At the end of the day, this is an input-output game. You’ll get out exactly what you’re willing to put in. I’ve made sure the infrastructure is tight enough that the only thing left is pure accountability on your end.​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​ Let’s grow together 💪🏽🔥

Let me know your thoughts on this argument as I have deployed it a few times when someone asks why I'm not a muslim and it doesn't actually pit Christianity VS Islam as it's doing an internal epistemic critique of the Quran's own revelation. Surah 4:157 denies the crucifixion: wa-lākin shubbiha lahum — "but it was made to appear so to them." On the Quran's own account, Allah caused the crucifixion to appear to occur when it did not. The predictable consequence — held across two millennia by hundreds of millions — is the central false belief of the world's largest religion. The Muslim response typically appeals to Ezekiel 14:9 ("I the Lord have deceived that prophet") as a biblical parallel. It isn't one. The two cases are categorically different, and the difference matters because it determines whether divine deception is a contingent judicial act or a standing divine attribute. The Argument P1. Surah 4:157 attributes the appearance of the crucifixion directly to divine causation. Shubbiha lahum is a passive construction with Allah as the implicit agent. P2. Ezekiel 14:9 is categorically different: it describes God hardening a prophet who has already compromised with idolaters, on a people who have already rejected the covenant. It is responsive, particular, and announced (cf. 1 Kings 22:19-23, where Micaiah openly tells Ahab the lying spirit is operating). It is judicial, not essential. P3. The crucifixion deception in 4:157 has none of these features. The witnesses had not rejected the Quranic revelation — it didn't exist yet. The propagation extends to people across centuries with no access to correction. It is unannounced, non-judicial, and indiscriminate. P4. Therefore Allah is, on the Quran's own testimony, a deceiver in the essential sense — one who produces appearances that create enduring false belief, where deception is a positive divine attribute rather than a contingent moral response. Conclusion. A genuine inquirer has no non-circular epistemic warrant for trusting the Quran itself. If Allah causes appearances that produce false belief in matters of central religious importance, the inquirer cannot rule out that the Quran is itself such an appearance. The framework destroys its own foundation.