Hi all (again), I am currently working with a Client which has asked me to carry out a C&I compliance assessment on vendor skid coming from China. The skid is fair size (approx. 400m²) as it contains a full Pyrolysis unit along with it's own BPCS Control System and Independent Fail Safe Controller. Among all the other C&I compliance checks I am doing, the Functional Safety checks is one of the main items on my radar. My initial TQ's to this particular vendor contain queriers around how they have managed their SIL rated trips, i.e. which Safety Standard have they complied with? and also what lifecycle documentation they can provide, i.e. Hazard Study Reports, SRS, SIL Verification Calcs, SIF Validation evidence etc? (I am awaiting their response) .. I often hear that we should treat Vendor packages as black boxes, however I believe there must be some level of assessment which must be carried out by the Principal Designer to ensure the equipment being supplied is compliant to our standards, and has followed robust safety lifecycle? My question to the team is, what sort of assessment would you carry out on 3rd party skids the size of this? Again, any opinions on this one would be hugely appreciated!

SILVerify is back online with new features What's new: → Build your own approved failure rate library — access any device in one click on any future project → Integrated AI assistant for in-app support — answers questions from the user guide instantly If you do SIL verification under IEC 61508 or IEC 61511, it's worth a look. I'm really happy with this now, it's going to save me a lot of time, thanks for your patience, everyone → Sample project is now included — let me know what you all think, please 🙏 https://silverify.co.uk/

I have a question for you regarding the cybersecurity of SIS. Do you have any experience in this area? The IEC 61511 gives some requirement for analyzing SIS cybersecurity. I see in practice, that this topic is often overlooked and not part of a comprehensive risk assessment. From my perspective, this results from the fact that OT cybersecurity is still not well-developed. I have the impression that there is a significant lack of specialists in this field. An ordinary IT professional doesn't understand the operation of automation systems and control networks, and automation and control engineers don't have such in-depth knowledge of cyber threats. Do you see this problem in your own country? I have only basic knowledge in this field. Can you recommend any good sources of knowledge on this subject?

SILVerify is briefly offline today while I carry out some updates. What's been added: → Device library — a controlled register of failure rate data. Store your approved λD, DC, SFF, and SC values once, with a record of who verified the data and on what basis. One click fills any channel from your library on any future project. → Full 2oo3 and 1oo2 support across all three subsystems — sensors, logic solver, and final elements — with CCF assessment, beta factor derivation, and SC synthesis per IEC 61508 Clause 7.4.7. → In-app help page with an AI assistant that answers questions from the user guide. Back online later today. Will post to notify when it's live

Hi All, I am currently writing a proof test procedure for a High-High Temperature SIF. The sensor is 3-wire RTD. After carrying out all the proof testing checks, I have included for an RTD Calibration check to be carried out at the end, using a decade box or loop calibration device e.g. Fluke 754). Reason being, I wanted to ensure the loop was functioning correctly still after disconnecting sensor wires etc, during the proof test. However, my Client has requested this to be removed from the Proof Test as this is done as part of other existing maintenance routines. Just want to get anyone's thoughts on this, as to whether it is overkill to include an RTD check, and I should simply just ask the user to check the RTD is within it's prescribed calibration date? Any opinions on this would be appreciated!