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Functional Safety Play Book

230 members • Free

10 contributions to Functional Safety Play Book
Mission Time
Hi all, thanks for accepting. First of all, I am new in functional safety and sorry for my bad english😊. Actually I have some doubt about one of variable in PFDavg calculation namely mission time, couple of question to all: 1. What will happen in the end of mission time?should end user decommissioned the plant?or just replace everything and the mission time will get restarted? 2. If it depend on end user, than based on what consideration usually for them to determine the correct mission time?and what is the reason behind that? 3. Since by the time PFDavg will get derated, and SIL claimed may decreased over the time, shouldn't end user decide to set the mission time before the SIL/RRF drops beyond the rating it should be? Hope you guys can share your knowledge. Thanks,
1 like • 8d
@Dmitry Kosianchik It's rather an "useful lifetime" of the component. A manufacturer determines how long the component's failure rate is constant in time that is guaranteed by him. Of course it can be assumed as some factor which can be helpful during determining the mission time.
0 likes • 7h
I wonder why the standards don't include a definition of Mission time, even though we use this term almost every day.
Safety Compliance Checks on Vendor Skids
Hi all (again), I am currently working with a Client which has asked me to carry out a C&I compliance assessment on vendor skid coming from China. The skid is fair size (approx. 400m²) as it contains a full Pyrolysis unit along with it's own BPCS Control System and Independent Fail Safe Controller. Among all the other C&I compliance checks I am doing, the Functional Safety checks is one of the main items on my radar. My initial TQ's to this particular vendor contain queriers around how they have managed their SIL rated trips, i.e. which Safety Standard have they complied with? and also what lifecycle documentation they can provide, i.e. Hazard Study Reports, SRS, SIL Verification Calcs, SIF Validation evidence etc? (I am awaiting their response) .. I often hear that we should treat Vendor packages as black boxes, however I believe there must be some level of assessment which must be carried out by the Principal Designer to ensure the equipment being supplied is compliant to our standards, and has followed robust safety lifecycle? My question to the team is, what sort of assessment would you carry out on 3rd party skids the size of this? Again, any opinions on this one would be hugely appreciated!
0 likes • 1d
@Anth Gunn Such cases are common with larger investments. The situation isn't difficult if we have precise guidelines for vendors, like doing HAZOP or FS analyses with investor on board and based on defined risk target criteria. But it's not always so beautiful. Do your activities include conducting an analysis to determine SIL requirements after the HAZOP completion? There are two points of contact in this case: risk scenarios from the skid can affect the requirements already defined for safety functions in the main part of the process (let's say that black box stops being black). On the other hand, upstream or downstream external process part of the skid can affect the SIL requirements for safety functions (if any) in the skid. The second situation is usually more problematic, as there's no way to change what is already installed there. And one more additional though: a good compliance with IEC 61511 / 61508 doesn't mean that there is a compliance with common sense :) Example: very good SIF documentation with SIL assessment based on completely different risk targets than expected on the site. FSA should detect such issues.
Functional safety education
I would like to ask a question to all members of this group. I am curious whether topics related to functional safety are covered in technical university studies in your place of living. I am not referring to commercial training centers, but to the formal education system for engineers. A perspective from Poland: we have only one academic institution that seriously addresses this subject in its program. It's Gdańsk University of Technology at Faculty of Electrical and Control Eng. I had a great opportunity to work at this institution several years ago. Together with my colleagues we developed this field of knowledge there .
1 like • 5d
On the one hand, most automation and control engineers today encounter safety instrumented systems in industrial facilities. These systems are largely subject to functional safety standards. On the other hand, people entering the job market with a degree in this field have no idea what functional safety is, as it's not part of the educational program. Don't you find this an interesting observation?
Proof Testing
Hi All, I am currently writing a proof test procedure for a High-High Temperature SIF. The sensor is 3-wire RTD. After carrying out all the proof testing checks, I have included for an RTD Calibration check to be carried out at the end, using a decade box or loop calibration device e.g. Fluke 754). Reason being, I wanted to ensure the loop was functioning correctly still after disconnecting sensor wires etc, during the proof test. However, my Client has requested this to be removed from the Proof Test as this is done as part of other existing maintenance routines. Just want to get anyone's thoughts on this, as to whether it is overkill to include an RTD check, and I should simply just ask the user to check the RTD is within it's prescribed calibration date? Any opinions on this would be appreciated!
1 like • 5d
Typically, calibration and verification are part of the transmitter and process connection test procedure, which is described in the safety manual. To meet the hardware proof test coverage requirements, all steps of this procedure must be completed. However, in reality, calibration sometimes is performed as a separate task, for example, by a dedicated external service provider. In my opinion, in such cases, the task can be considered as completed based on a signed report of performed calibration. I have encountered this situation several times, and based on an agreement with the installation owner, we considered such a document valid.
Discussion about SIS cybersecurity
I have a question for you regarding the cybersecurity of SIS. Do you have any experience in this area? The IEC 61511 gives some requirement for analyzing SIS cybersecurity. I see in practice, that this topic is often overlooked and not part of a comprehensive risk assessment. From my perspective, this results from the fact that OT cybersecurity is still not well-developed. I have the impression that there is a significant lack of specialists in this field. An ordinary IT professional doesn't understand the operation of automation systems and control networks, and automation and control engineers don't have such in-depth knowledge of cyber threats. Do you see this problem in your own country? I have only basic knowledge in this field. Can you recommend any good sources of knowledge on this subject?
1-10 of 10
Tomasz Barnert
2
5points to level up
@tomasz-barnert-4011
Head of process & functional safety department, CFSE, PhD

Active 12m ago
Joined Mar 11, 2026
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