https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/north-korea-says-south-korea-target-if-it-becomes-us-collective-defence-hub-2026-09-24/

The first Ethiopia-Tigray war killed around 500000 humans

One of the most important findings of my report is that we cannot understand contemporary political correctness if we begin with social media, cancel culture, or university speech disputes. The phrase itself predates Communism, but its twentieth-century ideological use is documented inside Communist political culture. In a 1930 Communist Party publication, students at Moscow’s Lenin School praised a position for providing a “politically correct perspective”—meaning conformity with the authorized Party position. Stalin-era Communist organization likewise revolved around the “correct political line,” deviation from that line, and the organizational machinery required to enforce it. The report traces that history directly. That matters today because de-escalation requires exactly what political-line thinking makes difficult: the ability to admit that your opponent can be wrong without being morally illegitimate, that a grievance can be real without belonging to one ideology, and that disagreement does not automatically identify an enemy. When political correctness functions as ideological enforcement rather than simple courtesy, the sequence becomes dangerous: define the approved language → attach moral legitimacy to it → classify deviation as moral failure → punish the transgressor → treat the punishment as justice. At that point, persuasion begins disappearing. If disagreement itself proves that someone is racist, fascist, communist, bigoted, reactionary, or otherwise beyond legitimate political participation, what incentive remains to listen, negotiate, correct an error, or de-escalate? The result is a feedback loop. One side's coercion produces legitimate reaction. Extremists attempt to capture that reaction. The opposing side then points to those extremists as proof that its original collective accusation was correct. Each extreme becomes recruiting material for the other. And that is precisely the kind of fracture hostile political-warfare systems historically sought to exploit. Soviet active measures used disinformation, fronts, agents of influence, covert political operations, and the exploitation of existing vulnerabilities rather than relying exclusively on grievances invented from nothing.