Jul 8 • 🏛️ Philosophy
Phenomenal Conservatism and Skepticism
Right now, I am trying to solidify, or at least improve, my epistemology. And I am currently reading "Skepticism and the Veil of Perception" by Michael Huemer. I'm about 2/3 into the book. Overall, I like his defense of phenomenal conservatism (PC). But there is a point of contention I have:
He says on pg. 103 that PC does not imply, "most of the time, when it seems as if P, P is true." But I am failing to see how PC can work without assuming the truth of that claim. If it weren't the case that "most of the time when it seems that P, P is true," why would one be prima facie justified in presuming that P is true? If the seeming that P does not say anything about how probable your belief is of being truth-tracking, then I don't see why the seeming does any justificatory work. After all, isn't the point of seeking justified beliefs to make it more probable that your beliefs are truth-tracking?
I would love to hear your thoughts if you have any! Perhaps I am just confused, in which case I would appreciate correction. Appreciate y'all!
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Phenomenal Conservatism and Skepticism
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