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25 contributions to Functional Safety Play Book
One SIF or two SIFs?
I would like to present a very common analytical scenario for discussion. It's related to a hazardous scenario which requires us to cut off the flow of the process medium to a some part of the installation. This is achieved by shutting down the pump. However, the system comprises two pumps (A and B) where one is in operation and the other in a standby mode. When verifying SIL, should we assume a single SIF with a 2oo2 configuration for the pump shutdown, or should we analyze two separate functions, each responsible for shutting down an individual pump?
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Quick question for the group 👇
I’ve always been interested in the management side of functional safety rather than the calculations. If you’re currently managing functional safety on a project, what is the one thing that causes you the most frustration? Don’t give me the textbook answer — tell me what actually annoys you. What do you find yourself repeatedly chasing, checking, updating or worrying about? I’m looking at ways we could make the management of functional safety significantly easier, so I’d really value some real-world examples from the group. Even if it seems like a small problem, put it below. 👇
0 likes • 4h
It might not be directly related to the FS management, but for me, the big issue is a lack of a common language and a shared understanding of the subject matter when dealing with external companies and clients. Internally, within the team, I also see a tendency for lessons learned from previous projects to be forgotten. C'mon how many times you can explain the same things... :)
The Playbook's been quiet — here's what's changing
I'll hold my hands up: I've been quiet in here for longer than I would have liked. Project work took over, and the community hasn't had the attention it deserves. That's changing from this week. Here's what's coming: - Decision Review Live is back — Friday 17th July, 6pm. Bring a real grey-area decision from a live project and we'll work through it together. - A new cohort of the nuclear programme opens in September — more on that shortly. - Q&A is coming back, running bi-weekly. - New SILVerify features are in development and will be live soon. - More case studies and guides on the way. Got a question sitting in your drafts? Post it, and let the community do its thing.
0 likes • Jul 7
I appreciate your work maintaining this forum. I have many ideas for topics, but not enough time to ask them before my vacation :)
0 likes • 14d
@Richard Kelly thank you. I see that this forum hasn't been very active lately. I have many ideas for topics to share, but I need to finish the project I am currently working on 👍
Valve SIL Calculation
Good morning Everyone, For valve SIL calculations, do we need to include the failure rates of all valve components, such as the solenoid, actuator, and valve body? Should the actuator and valve body also be included?
2 likes • 14d
That is correct. Any device whose failure could result in a safety function failure must be included in the calculations. Furthermore this includes also devices such as intrinsically safe barriers, etc.
SIL Calculation
Good day everyone, I have few questions on SIL Calculation. I have a PILZ controller in SIF and try to make some calculation by hand. Controller has DI and DO with CPU. 1. If I would like to calculate PFDavg for Controller then I should combine DI, DO and CPU PFD avarage, correct? (No redundancy at DIs and DOs) For ex, PFD input, single + PFD output, single+ PFD CPU = 2,20 x 10^-4 + 1,30 x 10^-5 + 6,20 x 10^-5 (See please certificate) 2. As you see the certificate shows only PFD but not λ DU. Can I calculate my λDU from PFD as referencing the formula below? PFDavg = (λDU * T)/2 . Actually, the certificate does not say what T has been taken into account on PFD calculation as well, but I am going to take it as 1 year. 3. CPU Part: 773103 ( PNOZ m1p ETH) ; Certificate Link: https://www.pilz.com/download/open/PNOZmulti_TUEV-Sued_BM_M6A-020132-0284-R01_R4_4_valid_2030-Jun-24_1002803-BM-34.pdf Thank you!
0 likes • Aug 24
@Khalid Kalbiyev The certificate indicates that the reliability assessment for this PLC was made on the machinery FS standard. So you hardly find PFDavg values there. So you have to find other solution for this issue. So, instead you have some PFH numbers which you can treat as λ and use them in your own calculations of PFDavg. Just take number of DIs and DOs that are needed to manage all input and output signals. Then add CPU. And also don't forget about other components which are part of the safety PLC (like power supply, communication modules, etc.). They are components in series in a reliability block diagram - just add them and calculate final probability of failure within your mission time with some assumed proof test interval and proof test coverage (may be a generic data from safety logic controller).
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Tomasz Barnert
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@tomasz-barnert-4011
Head of process & functional safety department, CFSE, PhD

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Joined Mar 11, 2026
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