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54 contributions to Functional Safety Play Book
Electrical final elements
Can anyone share their experience? Very practical two questions related to an issue which exists in many PFDavg calculations. What's your approach to a safety loop that includes typical electrical final elements, e.g. contactors? Although the IEC61508 and IEC61511 standards apply to electrical devices, many such solutions widely used in industry lack certification and reliability data. And if the data is available, it's usually related to PFH and is based on B10d - not well suitable for demand mode of operation calculations. Second one: how do you confirm their systematic capability?
0 likes • 15h
@Anth Gunn https://www.gambica.org.uk/static/uploaded/9a36b58d-9b1b-4665-ba154a9df43d77a0.pdf
1 like • 15h
I’ve always found this a great guide
The Playbook's been quiet — here's what's changing
I'll hold my hands up: I've been quiet in here for longer than I would have liked. Project work took over, and the community hasn't had the attention it deserves. That's changing from this week. Here's what's coming: - Decision Review Live is back — Friday 17th July, 6pm. Bring a real grey-area decision from a live project and we'll work through it together. - A new cohort of the nuclear programme opens in September — more on that shortly. - Q&A is coming back, running bi-weekly. - New SILVerify features are in development and will be live soon. - More case studies and guides on the way. Got a question sitting in your drafts? Post it, and let the community do its thing.
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Markov Model
Dear All, Long time i don't post. I am back with my planning to verify my SIL achievement of logic solver. I am using ABB AC800M HI (SIL3 capable), and has 1oo2D architecture where both CPU & Safety Module (diverse with the CPU) is executing logic simultaneously and have cross diagnostic feature. I saw exida 8 variables of PFDavg is describing in 1oo1 architecture only, and i know that exida uses Markov Process (continuous markov) for modelling. I want to verify my SIL achievement use the same method, however i have 1oo2D architecture not 1oo1 and i need to consider the beta factor as well in my equation. Any of you have the literature to derive the PFDavg from markov process? I have discussed with AI as well and it can show me how to do from addressing the states and kormogolov differential equation, but i'm not entirely sure, i know you all may have experience regarding this matter, if you can please give me the flowchart how to do or to share some whitepaper of this matter, i may need some actual literature to back me up of my calculation later.
0 likes • 3d
Hi @Iyan Putra I've finally managed to get some advice on this question so this answer isnt all me its not something I actually have a massive amount of experience with 😁 The 1oo2D formula in IEC 61508-6 Annex B.3.2.2.4 (the one @Dmitry Kosianchik GOST figures show) is itself a Markov-derived closed form. It's a Taylor-series reduction of the exact Kolmogorov solution, built under the simplifying assumptions listed in B.3.1 — which is exactly why PTC and MT don't show up in it. The standard never extended the PTC treatment to 1oo2D; it only worked that extension for plain 1oo2, in B.3.2.5. So your instinct that you need to go back to the underlying Markov chain to get a realistic PFDavg (with PTC and beta handled explicitly) is correct, not a workaround. The literature you're after is already in the standard — Annex B.5.1–B.5.2 of 61508-6:2010 (the section right after the tables Dmitry posted). It derives the whole thing from first principles: 1. Define your states — for 1oo2D that's finer-grained than 1oo2: both channels good, A-down-detected (running 1oo1 via the comparator), B-down-detected, both-detected→safe, A-down-undetected, B-down-undetected, CCF. 2. Build the transition rate matrix [M] from λDU, λDD, λSD, μ=1/MRT, μDD=1/MTTR, the channel comparison efficiency K, and β/βD. 3. Solve the Kolmogorov forward equation dP(t)/dt = [M]P(t) → P(t) = e^(t[M])P(0). 4. Because proof tests are discrete events, not continuous, you need the multiphase model (Fig. B.24/B.29): split the timeline at each test, and use a linking matrix [L] to reset state probabilities at each boundary — that's literally a discrete-time Markov process bridged between phases. 5. Sum the probabilities of unavailable states to get U(t), then integrate: PFDavg(T) = (1/T)Σ qk·MCTk(T) (the Mean Cumulated Time method). 6. To bring PTC in explicitly: split each undetected-failure branch into a "caught at next proof test" path (weighted by PTC) and a "survives to next real demand" path (weighted by 1-PTC), exactly as B.3.2.5 does for 1oo2 — you're just adding that same branching to the 1oo2D chain instead of the 2-state 1oo2 one. MT (mission/demand time) is that same T2 from B.3.2.5 — it's the exposure window for the (1-PTC) fraction, the time a missed fault sits undetected until a real demand reveals it. 7. Beyond the standard itself: ISA-TR84.00.02-2002 (in 61508-6's bibliography) runs the same Markov methodology with more worked architectures including 1oo2D. Rausand's Reliability of Safety-Critical Systems (Wiley) has a full chapter deriving these chains by hand. SINTEF's PDS Method handbook treats PTC and beta inside a Markov-consistent framework specifically for SIS — that's probably your closest match for backing the calc.
SILVerify new feature
Hi everyone, I’m working on something new for SILVerify — an AI coach to help newer FS engineers work through SIL verification calculations. Would this be useful to you or your team? Just trying to gauge if it’s something that would be useful or not. Drop a comment.
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FSA Reports - Lessons Learned & Critical SIS Findings in Oil & Gas Projects!
1. Based on your experience with FSA Stage 1 to 5 in EPC Oil & Gas projects, what are the most critical anomalies or non-conformities usually identified onsite compared to approved documents such as SRS, Cause & Effect, FAT, and SAT? 2. From your lessons learned, what are the most frequent issues encountered during FSAs: - poor SIS bypass management, - overdue proof testing, - DCS/SIS integration gaps, - incomplete MOC process, - or field vs As-Built discrepancies?
1 like • May 20
Hi Bachir, in my experience SRS is always the main issue, because if that wrong then so is everything else.
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Richard Kelly
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@richard-kelly-4141
Functional Safety Expert with 15+ years in Nuclear Defence, simplifying FS to what’s needed—no more, no less.

Active 4h ago
Joined Aug 18, 2025