Here is a sample: "But markets, and for that matter voters, are naturally suspicious. The announced intentions are much more credible if there are incentives to pursue the stated course of action. A future monetary policy action is credible if it is in the interest of the monetary authorities to enact this policy when the time comes. Hence policy is credible when the authorities’ actions are, as economists put it, ‘time consistent’, that is the authorities have no incentive to deviate from their original intentions." "The ability of the authorities to spring monetary surprises on an unsuspecting public allows them to exploit the short-term trade-off between inflation and output to achieve temporarily higher output. Anticipating this reaction, economic agents in the private sector come to expect inflation and to build such expectations into their wage and price-setting behaviour. Inflation will rise to a level beyond which the authorities will not choose to spring further inflation surprises, and the result of this ‘game’ between public and private sectors is an inbuilt inflation bias to policy."