Quick one today, but the lead story is a "stop what you're doing" kind of bug if you run OpenCode on Windows or WSL. Everything else is standards drama and a $65K excuse to vibe code a game. OpenCode's MCP sign-in bug let a server run commands on your machine Here's the setup: OpenCode connects to MCP servers to give your agent outside tools. When you sign in to one of those servers, the server gets to hand you a web address for OAuth — the "go here to authorize" link. On Windows and WSL, OpenCode passed that address into a PowerShell command without escaping it. Pillar Security found that a malicious address could carry a PowerShell payload and run it, with your access, the moment you signed in. The scary part isn't really the bug. Command injection happens. It's how it got fixed. Anomaly (the company behind OpenCode) patched it in version 1.18.33 on September 28, buried inside a pull request labeled as a "refactor" of browser-launch code. No security advisory, no CVE. Pillar reported it privately on August 29 and asked Anomaly to request a CVE; Anomaly's answer, per Pillar, was that a malicious MCP server is "outside our trust boundary." That means your dependency scanner and vulnerability alerts have nothing to match against. The only way to know you're exposed is to go check the version number yourself. Worth noting: your MCP server doesn't need to start out malicious. One you vetted and added months ago could get compromised later, or its domain could lapse and get bought by someone else, and you'd never know until sign-in runs a command on your box. The fix: upgrade to 1.18.33 or later if you're on Windows or WSL. If you can't upgrade today, run opencode mcp list, look at what remote servers you've got configured, and rip out anything you haven't fully vetted. macOS and Linux aren't affected — OpenCode doesn't route the browser launch through a shell there. And this is separate from the OpenCode Console breach reported around the same time, which may have exposed stored API keys.