Hi everyone, I wanted to share some thoughts I’ve been developing around reshaping early-stage shipbuilding programs. This is a detailed concept exploring how an Integrated Shipbuilding Partner (ISP) model combined with AI-enabled processes might improve integration, risk management, and industrial base alignment. I’m very interested in hearing your perspectives on this, particularly from those with experience in shipyards, design firms, acquisition, and maritime operations. Some questions to consider as you read: - How practical do you think an ISP model would be in real-world shipbuilding programs? - What challenges or benefits do you foresee with AI-enabled integration across concept to construction? - How might risk and liability need to shift to support this approach? - What early investments could most effectively reduce downstream rework and schedule risk? Please share your thoughts, experiences, or any questions you have. Looking forward to a rich discussion! Note: A version of this post was also shared on LinkedIn in a more concise format due to platform character limits. I’m sharing the full detailed version here to foster deeper discussion within this community. As I’ve been reviewing the new Vessel Construction Manager (VCM) RFP, I keep coming back to whether there’s an opportunity to reshape how we structure early-stage shipbuilding programs, especially as both industry and Government acknowledge that the current model needs to evolve. One idea I keep returning to is whether a VCM could function more like an Integrated Shipbuilding Partner (ISP)—not a single individual, but an organization or team selected early through its own competitive process. Under a MAC-type structure, both designers and shipyards could be prequalified based on capability, capacity, digital maturity, and past performance. When a new program begins, the Government could select an ISP from this pool to lead early integration, while designers and shipyards compete for their respective roles within a more structured and better-informed framework. This preserves competition while improving alignment, design maturity, and industrial-base utilization from the outset.

The Executive Order (EO) released by President Trump in April 2025 opens with a blunt assessment of America's position in global shipbuilding - and it does not pull any punches. "Both our allies and our strategic competitors produce ships for a fraction of the cost needed in the United States. Recent data shows that the United States constructs less than one percent of commercial ships globally, while the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is responsible for producing approximately half. Rectifying these issues requires a comprehensive approach that includes: 1. securing consistent, predictable, and durable Federal funding, 2. making United States-flagged and built vessels commercially competitive in international commerce, 3. rebuilding America’s maritime manufacturing capabilities (the Maritime Industrial Base), and 4. expanding and strengthening the recruitment, training, and retention of the relevant workforce" These four pillars form the backbone of the administration's strategy, but each comes with its own deeply rooted challenges. Select one and give your thoughts. I have always subscribed to the belief that you cannot come up with solutions unless you first understand the problems. I have views on all 4, however I'll start with just peeling off the top layer (of many layers) of #3 since I have ALOT of experience in this area. Again, this only scratches the surface. In future posts, I’ll dig deeper into how we can rebuild a distributed, resilient, and competitive maritime industrial base — one that includes every yard, every region, and every worker. America's maritime manufacturing base has not just declined - it has thinned, consolidated, and lost resilience. One of the many contributors to this decline has been due to the nation's focus on protecting only a select few of the shipbuilders in the U.S. There are many shipyards that build small to medium-size vessels. These small and mid‑tier yards — with many located across the Gulf Coast — represent some of the most adaptable and commercially competitive shipbuilders in the country. Yet federal policy has rarely treated them as strategic assets. Besides being limited to competing for the smaller vessels needed by our Navy and USCG, their survival has depended on their ability to compete and win commercial shipbuilding projects that serve e.g. the Offshore, Wind, Ferry, and other markets. These segments of the market are obviously very competitive, and the unique nature of the projects have resulted in the small to medium size yards developing very unique knowledge, skills and abilities along the way. Such capability does not necessarily transfer to the largest yards that for decades have designed and built, e.g. submarines and aircraft carriers.