Nov '24 • General discussion
Eleutherian Hermanism and Major Ethical Theories
The aim of this paper is to present an understanding of ethical theories from the lens of Eleutherian Hermanism. It is to take the philosophical methods used in the construction of ELH and apply them to other ethical theories. It is not a verbatim discussion of the ethical theories as presented in the text of the original authors but an interpretation that is wholly my own. I aim to reinterpret the philosophies of Utilitarianism from Bentham, Kantian Deontology, and Nicomachean Virtue ethics to construct their mores inside of the philosophical space of knowledge. I aim not to dismantle their constructions but to compare their answers to the questions of ethics, with Eleutherian Hermanism. These are claims from the text but are not the text. They are my thoughts regarding these ethical systems. I aim to reinterpret the theory of good, guide morality-based understanding, judge morality-based understanding, and the theory of justice of these three important ethical systems and relate them to Eleutherian Hermanism. First, we must start with the positive construction of Eleutherian Hermanism:
Universal Proof of the Definition of Good:
1. The good will wills good.
2. Respect of the good will is definitionally good. This is true by definition.
3. The good will wills good on itself and all other things. This is the process of the good will willing good or moral consideration.
4. The respect of the good willed subject’s will is good because it is the good will. If the good will wills the disrespect of the good willed subject then the good willed subject respects the good will with its own disrespect. This is punitive justice or a failure of higher order duties.
5. The good will advances the good willed subject to do good in the future. This is good by a different scope.
6. If the good will is respected then good will have been done. Good results come from the aims of the good will.
7. The good will wills good for everything. This is true because of 3, 4, 5, and the duty to abstract good (Herman 22-23).
These claims are the central claims of ELH. They map out the forces of the good will that cause all subsequent definitions and constitute the metaphysical space of knowledge of ELH.
Terms, Seeds, and Definitions of ELH:
Now that we have the main metaphysical claims of Eleutherian Hermanism, we must define some terms and arguments to aid the understanding of the rest of the paper:
These definitions are from The Physics of Morals by Lewis Herman, pages 4-10 and 60-76.
Judge Morality: this is the judgment of morality after the action takes place. It is what composes the ends of morality to see if the aims are achieved. For ELH, this is Hermanism.
Guide Morality: This is the judgment of morality before the action. This is the actor morally considering things. For ELH, it is Eleutherianism.
A Hitobh is an ethical law that serves as both the judge morality and the guide morality. It is the structure of Eleutherian Hermanism and Virtue ethics. It decides moral content on both means and ends. It also has the implication that the means are the ends. This is from the method scope critique and the theory of cause and effect from ELH, and the theory that the process of virtue is what always causes virtuous ends from Nicomachean Ethics.
Orders of Duty: A first order duty is defined as the immediate choice an actor makes in setting themselves up with a moral choice. This is character. It is the activity of duty of the subject. The second order duty is the construction of the moral space to create the best outcome morally through both restricted choice and freedom. These are also the agent-based constructions of duty. This is done by creating a space where it is easier to get the best outcome; It is also the agent's influence on a subject. The logistics of morality. Amicology or the theory of the 2nd order space is the container of this construction. The third order duty is the construction of the moral spaces and the interaction between spaces. This is the ideology of society or the construction of the laws of the nation state. The fourth order duty is the construction of the moral space between ideologies or the meta-ideology of interactions between any two differing ideologies. The 4th order duty can be anything from the duty of the federal government to the states, and vice versa, or the duty between religions or creeds that differ on fundamental grounds.
History is defined as the past circumstances of the reality that is under consideration for the decisions of the adjudicatory process of the good will. The actual adjudicatory process will come later in the book.
Method is the description of the objects that are all involved in the action. For murder, it can be stabbing, shooting, or strangling. This is the objects interacting with each other.
Scope is the aim of the action and its continued effects before remedy.
The Method Scope Critique is the process by which activity is constructed in reality. It is the fact that the means are the effect. The method is the action that describes the physical process that causes all scopes. This could be the act of stabbing, pushing a button, or waving to cause the effects. The method scope critique is brought up in detail in the Kantian section.
Remedy is the change that occurs after crime to prevent harm from continuously occurring.
Aji is the term used to define something that comes from the position or constraints of a subject. It is the circumstance's effect on the subject, or the aim guided by the circumstance before the action. Dinner party aji is when the subject determines what is acceptable behavior from the circumstances and acts accordingly.
Adjudication is the process by which something is decided from constraints or impositions. Social mores, systems of justice, and warfare are all examples of adjudication. The mores may decide who gets something first, such as a line of customers. A system of justice may decide who wins a court case. Warfare is the ultimate example of power adjudication.
Atoms are a subset of a larger calculus as containers of activity. In the metaphysics portion, “atomically” is used to talk about the A Priori aims of the good will. The good will wills good on humans atomically. If there is a failure of higher order duties, or the constraints of reality forces it, the good will makes a choice according to the ELH calculus. This is done through a combination of the atoms and then the adjudicatory process of the good will or the ELH calculus according to theories of good.
Agents are both will and subject, both subject and object, and are viewed as representations of their system of agents. A system of agents is the group of which the mores are a part of. This is a main atom of how mores shape character and culture of the second order.
The process of Fusion of ethics is the relation by which metaphysics ties a space of knowledge together. It is where the aims, processes, values, and virtues all collide from the same space of knowledge.
Suppose the good will wills that which produces a feeling. This feeling is then called Khorosho or any feeling that the good will wills. The opposite, or Cherdu, is any feeling the good will avoids. These two words map out the truth value of axiomatic result based ELH or when we try to seed ELH to come up with something similar to utilitarianism or any feeling in the abstract. Khorosho is desired by the good will by definition.
Feelings can also be cases of justice. Guilt is an example of a feeling which is the conscious telling us to right a wrong.
Freedom often justifies wrong as much as it justifies moral action. Where does moral freedom come from in the good will? It comes from preference, the respect for the Khorosho of freedom, and all the good that comes from free people as a good societal tactic. There are two phenomena when we see freedom: Positive freedom and negative freedom. Positive freedom is that it is good to do things simply because you are free to do them. Negative freedom is the freedom not to have things happen to you. Freedom as a seed is both of these things. The Khorosho of freedom or freedom as an end is how political theorists justify freedom as a value. Freedom is an end in itself and solves many problems better than imposed system. The Khorosho of freedom is a moral aim. The imposition of freedom or disrespect of social norms for the purposes of ignoring culture and collections of mores is an example failing to respect the will of others.
Justice: Justice is the most complicated seed of morality. It is the seed which constitutes judgment, fairness, and all things that are just. We seed justice with several cases. The first: The settling of disputes. All good will definitions can come from the good will itself and the outcome of the seeded Hermanism. The seeds of morality, such as justice, are performative definitions that are just: “What the good will does to perform this value" with the iterative action of ELH to create best practices.
Just Mastery: The just action that weighs moral content after the seeds is not what this section is about. Only the seeds of justice, however vague, are discussed in this section.
Just Result is the aim of the good will. It is the most just and thus good result of activity. This is the process by which a good will finds its aims for a construction of the will to be just or the aim of justice of the good willed subject or system. This is a result that is the moral duty of processes of agreement over shared extensions of agents, individual justice if pertaining to the individual, and minority rights if the majority is in the wrong. A just result is always something that advances the position of good and the appeal of good authority through compromise, rewards, and through superior respect for the good, willed subject.
The mastery of justice that must come after a crime is the process by which we restore harm to a subject. This is called subject justice. This subject can be a state, person, group, or anything that can be wronged. The evil to this subject is measured and the process by which we seek correct restitution for the subject is justice. The seed is from the will, so if the subject wants the assailant harmed that is subject justice; If the subject wants to be paid by the assailant that is subject justice; If the subject wants to forgive that is subject justice. Any combination of these things is the direction of the subject. Thus, subject justice is defined as the restorative process of the good will making good for the wronged subject’s will. This does not imply that we do exactly what the wronged subject demands but that subject justice is always in the direction set by the wronged will.
The components of subject justice are thus anything we do to make good. Vengeance, the punishment of the assailant, payment, or simply forgiveness are all valid components of subject justice. The question is when does justice become unjust? The evil that is measured by Hermanism is restored until the subject has justice. This means the good must be done until the debt is repaid. Any activity that is done after that is not subject justice and is a separate moral adjudication.
The amount of harm then comes from the empirical measured quantity of harm. This is decided philosophically from fully seeded Hermanism. All duties weighed and composed into a unit called Harm Value. A harm value is the unit by which we determine the good of justice or the harm of injustice. It is the H value in the calculus of Hermanism that allows us to see what is the harm of the activity that should be repaired.
Punitive Justice is the aim of the good will to punish someone through harm for a crime. This usually means that the aim of the will is simply to punish on principle in relation to subject justice. There are many reasons why culturally punitive justice is used in history, but the good will must have a good reason to punish as punitive justice is the only form of justice that I personally think is misused widely. Most systems of authority have punitive justice built in to disallow certain behaviors that are merely an expression of freedom. A father may punish a child for misbehaving. Whether or not the child is morally punished depends on the nature of the crime or if there is even harm in the first place. With regard to subject justice, punitive justice is not to right wrongs but to punish the assailant for attempted crimes.
Punitive Principle Justice is the process by which the good will administers justice from principle. This is the case of attempts of harm which are shaped into something that is harmful on principle. This is done from a lens of strict to merciful. Once the crime that was attempted or committed is gauged for attempted harm to a subject, the harm value is gauged. This is done from knowledge of space creation for harm to not be done. An example of this is the case of drug induced rape. If there is no objective harm done to a subject, but the action had the effect of rape the crime is punished according to the harm of the attempt if done without the aji created to minimize objective harm.
Restorative Justice is the process by which the harm of something is undone. This is the remedy of the good will. One takes the continuous harm of the method and attempts to prevent harm in the future through moral activity.
All other Methods of Rule are constrained in the section on Just Mastery. Policy is as limitless and adaptable as circumstances. Anti-monopoly legislation is called anti-monopoly legislation. Denial of substances such as highly enriched uranium is called Nuclear Policy. These are enumerable and all proven the same from prudence and wisdom of empirically verifiable data. All of these are called Just Policy.
Principle Justice: The principle value of any moral value is the value’s H value without the effect of the value. There is an implied, from the definition of the good will, philosophical value to any principle value and ELH functions without them. I call the theory of good, the theory of what the H values should be in actual practice of morality, principled if it considers the Kantian way of adding principle values to the calculus, and pragmatic if it ignores the principle and only assesses the effect. This leads us to principle justice, or principled H value imposition in general. First, the general philosophy of
Positional injustice is defined as all choices being unjust. This is a failure of higher order duties.
Reward comes from the will as a result of the activity needing the reward. The direction of the reward being the will’s decision. Thus, money is only a reward as long as the will seeks it. The direction of the reward being what the subject needs and wants to do their duty in the world. Usually, systems of reward are construed as systems of exchange. The 2nd order construction of the reward system being the exchange of money for labor, food for money, or money for money. Systems of reward are different from systems of exchange as they represent all forms of activity rather than systems of exchange. For example, the reward for taking medicine is the presence of better health or the alleviation of symptoms. All rewards are based on experience and justification for what happens to the human subject after the activity that causes the reward to occur. Reward cannot be the allowance of immoral activity. This is not a reward but a detriment. There is no good will that rewards someone with something that allows others to be wronged.
Consent is defined as the willing of the activity within personal subject’s personal control. The two types of consent being what the personal will wills and what the agent-based duty wills. Consent itself operates as a fully realized kingdom of ends. If all respect all wills, we get a similar kingdom of ends as free societies. This means consent can be violated if it results in duty to be done.
Authority is defined as the willing of the activity based on professional duty. Professional duty being someone who has the duty of study, experience, or anything that results in a better decision-making process that can be empirically measured. Authority can also come from stations as generals can order soldiers to do things or doctors prescribing medicine.
Theft can be defined two ways as the improper or lack of correct activity in a system of exchange that is based on ELH. This system must be defined as a consciousness of property that is accepted and considers all aspects of the moral social order, and the first order duty of theft, or the Hermanist based judgment, that must be negative in order for us to consider it crime. The consciousness of property can be based on the synthesis of these two things as both are forces that must be united to have a coherent theft policy. The principle of theft is often when the good will fails in the duty to construct spaces where all prosper. Thus, the duty of crime prevention is a duty of the 2nd order and is to construct spaces where there is no need for crime. Claim is what is used to settle disputes around property.
Ownership is defined as property being accepted as yours by the good will. Think of the world as a lawless place where claim is defined by the maximization of good. If a priceless artifact is owned by a museum for display you can’t steal it to create a museum or collection of your own due to the process of just ownership. Even if duty compels you to steal you must steal with regard to the process of the good will deciding ownership through moral claim. In a true kingdom of ends the owner will just give it to you if it maximizes good. The duty to ownership is a real socially and morally constructed consciousness that prevents the injustice of forcing people to give up what is sentimentally and materially theirs.
Seeds of History: History is defined as the past results of reality that is under consideration for the decision of the adjudicatory process of the good will. History is simply anything that is used to determine the past causes and their effects. The process by which the good will decides what is legitimate history that should be used in the adjudicatory process of the good will is the seeds of history. These seeds are anything that is used to make a moral decision when there is a past to base the future on. Usually these take effect when someone is trying to adjudicate activity that is from past causes.
Invention of Good:
Here are the four forces of the good will from the good will in terms of judge morality:
- Duty to the subject
- Duty to the abstract good
- Duty to the will
- Duty to the agent
What is implied in the definition of the Kantian good will? The duty to abstract good and the duty to the good willed is implied from the definition of the good will. So, there are two implications from the good will. The duty to the good willed subject and the duty to the good of the good will. The proof of abstract will be one that is done through the duty of the agent, as the will and subject are a part of the agent. We know what is “good” from the good will’s duty to advancing the good will and the good willed subject. Then we use this proof of what is good to speculate on what is the duty to good in the abstract. The third portion of the will based good definition is that of the good of just the will itself as duty to the will as the agent. The duty to the agent is the fourth duty of the good will (Herman 49-50).
The Duty to the Subject:
The duty to the subject is the process of willing good towards a person's body and feelings. This is the treatment of someone morally with their own feelings and physical body. This is the ability of someone to have the needs of life to allow health, survival, and all things that keep one able to do good. The subject is defined as the immediate atom of the human being without will. Phenomena, such as the extension of the subject, are the subject’s feelings towards, needs from, and promotes the furthering of the subject to do good in the future. These include romantic and familial agents, friends, and economic support systems such as employees and employers. Respect of the subject is what is needed for the atom of the individual to be treated well and survive. It is also good itself (Herman 50-51).
The Duty to the Will:
The duty to the will is the moral good that doesn’t directly conflict with others needs but are the reasonable authority and consent of the person. This is the will of certain freedoms, cultural mores, and the will of the subject over something of their own proven authority. The duty to the will is the process by which the good will allows someone to assert dominance, submission, and self-expression over what is good from the will. If the subject is harmed and the only gain is the will this is immoral in cases if it is not justice WC. This makes it so that the compulsive force of Eleutherian Hermanism to side with duty is enforced. Without the subject favored over the will then there is no adjudication with a standard of morality. It would simply be whoever is favored in some way would be freely allowed to wrong (Herman 56-57).
The duty to the will also is about adjudication between two peoples’ authority. This is the standard that tells us who is right and who is wrong in a conflict. Who deserves punishment and who deserves help. This is done through both the moral effect and process. The decision is one of advancing the moral effect of with considerations of both history and progress (Herman 56-57).
The Duty to the Abstract Good
The duty to the abstract good is The unknowable good of the good of the Goodwill there is nothing in being or phenomena that speaks to what this good is we only know from empirical evidence what this good is and from our honest attempts at good it is almost as if it is divine good or good that is not based in reality this is the least important good in terms of the physics or practice of morality it is the good that applies to all things thing animal creature and an object it is a good of property in nature it is a good separate and applied to the universe to things that may not be real and things that aren't covered in the duty to the subject.
The Duty to the Agent
The duty of the agent is something that covers both will and subject. It is the moral container of both the objective view of morality and the subjective view of morality. The duty to the agent is the combination of both the duty to the will and the duty to the subject. It speaks to those situations when something is harmful or beneficial to your subject and will. Agents are the interpersonal connections of someone and someone’s culture. I use the term agentivistic or agentivity to describe this phenomenon of the will and the subject being tied together. This phenomenon is the process of seeing one as a part of other people. The extension of the subject, the extension of the will, and the extension of the agent are all phenomena that seek to place the cooperative nature of culture, basic needs, and of community into being.
Overview of Ethical Spaces of Knowledge:
All the moral philosophy seemed to share the definition of terms from what I call the metaphysical space of knowledge. Virtue ethics defines virtue from the soul and two extremes. The middle word is then the correct and virtuous action between the two. The space of knowledge of utilitarianism is natural law (good as pleasure and harm as pain). Kantian moral philosophy, the space of knowledge is reason from the usage of Kantian scope. For each of these metaphysical spaces of knowledge we must compare them to Eleutherian Hermanism.
Virtue in Nicomachean Ethics:
Virtue ethics view aims as coming from the subject who aims. It views the category or container of knowledge of the aim as what is judged for success. In a way, virtue ethics is rule based as the moral judge comes from the adjudication of the category of the aim. Aristotle starts with the definitions of his own language and adjudicates based on what is said. A demonstration of this form of adjudication is “So let us grasp in how many ways the unjust person is spoken of. The lawbreaker, then, is held to be unjust, as is he who grasps for more and is unequal. It is clear as a result that the just person will be both lawful and equal. The just therefore, is what is lawful and what is equal; the unjust is what is unlawful and what is unequal” (Aristotle, 91). This use of language comes from the forms of the definition of these specific acts. The example of injustice is with an experience of injustice. This calls to the use of language to adjudicate and be the containers of the moral system. The language Aristotle uses is the interpretation of the soul in the presence of definitions that are scattered with no fusion of aims. They are simply the aims of the subject adjudicated with the social norms of the time. If someone were to demand more when they have less, such as someone who is a slave, would Aristotle side with the class of the slave as moral law or view them as a human being virtuous? It is this form of duty within containers of role that blind people in the process of law giving. Aristotle seems to side with a certain kingdom of ends that each is free to be and then are judged based on what they perform. The adjudication is of virtuous character with a constant political consciousness.
ELH adjudicates based on the seeds of Hermanism. Instead of a judge morality that takes the subjects aim and judges whether or not the action was successful atomically, ELH seeks to determine if a moral value was respected or disrespected by the moral values that the action violates or respects. Virtue could have the phenomena of two people acting virtuously but harming and destroying each other. ELH seeks values such as justice, freedom, a better world, and welfare that results in agreement and cooperation between moral people. There are no higher values that judge people who practice virtue ethics and can force ethical people to come to an agreement. Two warring generals are both virtuous if they perform their duty of warfare against each other no matter the cost of human life. Aristotle may say that one of the generals, due to the cause that they're fighting for, maybe unjust, but Aristotle is sure to agree that even generals who represent states that are not perfect have the duty to fight for their country. ELH determines who is in the right or what course of action is in the right. This means that in a conflict both people can be in the wrong even if there is a binary choice between them. ELH determines an agreement of just and good consideration to prevent the irreparable harm that comes with power adjudication. ELH determines from a higher order duty what the agreement should be. This adjudication between agents is what causes a certain process of disagreement that should always result in a serviceable kingdom of ends. An example of justice between warring parties from the ELHist perspective is the assessments of harms on both sides. These harms cause both parties to be in moral debt to one another. Once the debts are tallied up and the systems of agents or collections of agents which duty towards constitutes repair of these debts is agreed upon, the act of harm repair begins. In the case of warfare, these harms are often irreparable. One then must do the brutal calculus of life or life, injury for injury and seek to come to a place of forgiveness for these irreparable crimes. If material is lost the material must be regained. Good must advance and peace is always an advancement of good as long as justice reigns.
The middle term comes from the definition of activity is being a binary choice between two extremes. This definition of activity is speaking from the hitobhian judgment of success. One cannot be rash if it leads to victory. One cannot be cowardly if it saves lives from sure defeat. The judge is then the middle term that is always described as success. The extremes of the definition of activity are usually defined as inaction and transgression. It is usually the good characteristic being singular and opinion based while the two extremes are thought to be categories defined as excess. Take for example, the definition of just as equality. When Aristotle defines justice, he talks about the state of character being equal. This is famous and we see that most systems of justice see people as equal in the eyes of the law. The issue is that Aristotle has no fusion or process of adjudication between virtues. There is no justice from good. There is no unjust bravery or cowardly prudence. It seems as though Aristotle, through his process of containing moral history in words of virtue, needs a language that has near infinite combinations of all moral situations. The process of defining the aims of the goodwill from values and then testing from those values is an easier judge through the process of the fusion of the definition of the good will. The intersection of all moral values when they are seeded from the definition of the good will causes the moral space of knowledge to agree. Virtue ethics has different premises that can contradict through the process of Aristotle’s arguments. This is not a failure in Aristotle’s description of virtue, but it is a quality of ELH due to the arguments coming from the universal definition of good.
The invention of the theory of good of virtue ethics is through excellence, khorosho, and wisdom (Aristotle 32). It is these three aims that all of virtue ethics seeks to gain, but Aristotle's virtue ethics is a study of character; it is a study of the first order. It places people in their respective aji and compels duty or moral virtue from that position. There is no way for a system to behave bravely. There is a way for a system to be just, but Aristotle relies on judges who then perform the judgment in an effort to create a just system. It is actors within a system that are always the ones being judged. Aristotle’s description of virtue seems to describe the world as a collection of agents. It seems to describe the world as a collection of individual decisions and of states that are simply collections of men. There is no process behind history that imposes upon the subject. The process of how virtue is delegated to character means that the laws of the land tend to be hard to judge morally. I think Aristotle doesn’t disagree with the laws and history of the land he is writing in and views justice as Athenian democracy. This space of knowledge is rooted in the language of the era. It is personal reaction, and the forms of what virtue should be.
Utilitarianism:
The main claim of utilitarianism is that everyone is subject to nature. This is the natural law that governs all human morals. The judge morality of utilitarianism is pain for harm and pleasure for benefit. First, I will construct a system of language from this metaphysical space of knowledge. Then from this judge morality I will compare it to Eleutherian Hermanism to determine how the seeds of humanism and the seeds of natural law relate to each other.
Comparing Seeds:
For the purpose of this comparison, I will use the prefix U to denote justice from Utilitarianism and the prefix ELH to denote definitions from Eleutherian Hermanism. The Utilitarianism in question is from Bentham’s The Principles of Morals and Legislation. The space of metaphysical knowledge “Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do” (1). Is the main justification for these definitions of moral principles. These are my own interpretation of the seeds from Bentham.
Justice: The U justice has an appeal to the categories of emotion that come from our most base of instincts. ELH Justice comes from the rational will and our knowledge of what satisfies us with a deep construction of the subject. The tendency for utilitarian philosophy to view nature as our base instincts is the abolition of the values that come from the scope of pain and pleasure. It denies us the complexity of what it means to be human. These values from the scope of pain and pleasure are defined as positive and negative based on the natural reaction to the emotion. U bravery may be the ability to limit the pain of fear and have pleasure from the righteous action taken. ELH bravery may simply be the ability to perform morally according to ELH in the presence of fear.
History: The valid cases of U history are all pleasure and pain in the past. This is the understanding of cause and effect when it comes from reaction. There may be things that universally cause pleasure, things that subjectively cause pleasure, things that universally cause pain, and things that subjectively cause pain. The U history is an understanding of the self and knowledge of the self. Rule from U history is the axiomatic imposition of the causes of pleasure and pain on the subject. Rule from ELH history is the imposition of moral values outside the consideration of pain and pleasure. This makes it potentially more painful for the imposed subject due to the lack of the avoidance of pain if other moral values demand it.
Authority: U authority is the adjudication of someone being in a meritable role due to their knowledge of how to cause pleasure and avoid pain. This is the authority from power and the state. U authority comes from the legitimate positions that are tasked with the avoidance of pain and the gain of pleasure. ELH Authority is the position of knowledge and merit with the regard to best practices of endeavors. It is not meant as power but as knowable attempts at good from the state of proven past effects from history given power due to the aim of it.
Freedom: U freedom is the ability to create pleasure and avoid pain without the compulsion or imposition of values outside the natural law. It is the freedom to follow the basest of instincts and seek the noblest of joys as long as you are not harming someone else. ELH freedom is the ability to gain your preference in any system where a reasonable kingdom of ends is achieved. It is where duty is first, and freedom is second if there is still a moral imperative to act. The duty to ELH freedom is the duty to the will of individuals.
Just Mastery: U just mastery is the presence of everyone being allowed the joys of the material, physical, and anti-ascetic goals of the philosophy of Bentham. It is the imposition of hedonism as moral law. ELH just mastery is the allowance of both ascetic and hedonist moralities as the good is seeded from the will. The desire for both to live at peace and not conflict is done through the individual rights awarded to both lifestyles as long as they don’t conflict.
Just Result: U just result is anything that satisfies the desire for pleasure and the end of pain. It is the obedience of rule to hedonism. ELH just result is the result of the complicated process of becoming powerful enough to see moral good in the world, refining processes of good to gain a better outcome, and through sacrifice, resistance, struggle, and the work needed to achieve a moral world through tactics. It is the
Subject Justice: U Subject Justice seems to be the pleasure of remedying the harm that a mischievous troublemaker seems to cause. It is the total effects of all the pain the assailant caused not only the immediate victim but the state due to its transgressions.
Harm Value: U harm value is just the amount of pain someone experiences. ELH harm value is the adjudicatory harm before remedy or the continuous harm of the method if no remedy has happened. This is the effect of the harm on all agents, individuals, and systems before the effect has been remedied. These two harm values are very similar. Bentham describes the pain that is caused for all society in a very British way. It is entirely the trouble the harm causes the individual and the collections of agents known as society. All of this harm is weighed in U and ELH harm value.
Punitive Justice: U punitive justice is viewed as an evil unless it prevents a greater evil (Bentham 171). Punitive justice in ELH is often done through the removal of the subject from the freedom to harm others. It is the removal of freedom under negative justice and the punishment that offers satisfaction to the will of the wronged.
Punitive Principle Justice: U punitive principle justice doesn’t exist. If there is no harm done, then there is no foul (Bentham 179). ELH punitive principle justice is if the harm was successful or if it is iniquity to be discouraged. This is the principle of the act that is punished for the harm it could have caused or to discourage it in the future.
Restorative Justice: U restorative justice is to restore the feeling of security, cause pleasure to the wronged through remedy, and remove the pain of the crime from the person. ELH is to progress the victim to the point where benefit done to them is good rather than justice. It is to repair the harm until the world is restored to the moral state before the crime took place.
Health: U health is the ability to feel pleasure and the absence of pain. ELH health is from the moral perspective that is expressed through the actions of feeling good for being good. It is also the physical health of a patient that is remedied through medicine, therapy, and all things to return the person to a state of moral ability if possible.
Feeling: U feeling is that pleasure is the greatest good and pain is the greatest evil. ELH feels as though anything that the good will wills with respect to the subject’s will is the satisfaction of Khorosho. Cherdu is when a feeling is not healthy, reasonable, and thus is a symptom of illness or unjust, iniquitous emotion. This is the true root of the difference between ELH and Bentham’s Utilitarianism. It is the premise that causes them to differ. The difference between ELH theory of good and hedonism.
Reward: U pleasure is the greatest of all good things. ELH reward is done through the allowance of good to be done with the reward. The highest good is whatever satisfies the need of the person who is rewarded, then the reward must be shaped to allow for more moral good to result from the reward. Reward that lets people wrong others is immoral and is detriment to the kingdom of ends that ELH systems of reward seek to cultivate. This includes higher order rewards.
Theft: U theft is the taking of something that is not yours according to the standard of the systems of exchange of the state. ELH theft is something that the good will doesn’t will as yours. This leads to the advancement of moral good without the tyranny of property.
This concludes most of the seeds that are comparable between Bentham’s utilitarianism and ELH. The similarities when it comes to justice are the honest attempt at answering what justice is. Bentham does a good job of providing an illustration of ethics if it were truly hedonist.
Transcendent Law and The Linguistics of Kant:
The Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals is the main system of good that I critique to construct ELH. I start with the definition of the good will and write the logical progression of the method scope critique to construct the metaphysics of Eleutherianism. This guide morality is based entirely on Kantian deontology with the difference being the understanding of descriptions of activity and cause and effect. Here is my critique of Kantian Deontology.
On the Principle of the Good Will:
The current interpretation of the principle of the will calls for us to distill the maxim in such a way to obtain the principle on which one acts. It is only this principle of the will that Kant calls to for moral weight. The prohibition of what Kant calls the achievement of the ends disregards that the principle of the will can contain many scopes each of which are needed to determine moral weight. Look to the example of the maxim: “Preserving myself through murder in self-defense.” The principle of the will, the maxim on which I’m acting, can be divided into three separate principles: preserving myself (a Kantian duty), Murder (Categorically outlawed), and self-defense (the action with both these principles of the will considered). The best way to illustrate that the principle of the will can have many scopes is to phrase maxims in an active way. This can be done because the principle of the will is the reason for the action; The principle of the will that is acted upon. This phrasing is done by: Reason for the action or ends, “By,” and then, what I call, the method of the action. The use of the word: “In” such as “In self defense” provides a special case to illustrate this connection. To specify these maxims, that are phrased this way, I call them: Eleutherian maxims.
There are several scopes to the evaluative process of the principle of the will. This changes Kant entirely. Kant limits the action, as containing method and results, into what I call Kantian scope. This scope is the scope that is Kantian practice or his application of what is the principle of the will. The Kantian scope is the method plus a limitation to the immediate aims of the action. Murder is outlawed as: "method with the immediate aims of death"; Lying as: "speaking with the immediate aims of deception."
Eleutherian scope of the principle of the will is the full knowable action or active phrasing of the principle of the will. This is different from Kantian scope in that it does not constrain the action to, what Kant calls, a priori principles but allows the full action. This is done as the limitation of the action to a priori principles is a linguistic trick that forces only Kantian scope as the principle of the will. Take for example: “Speaking with the direct aims of deception.” This action is described as lying. Kant does this by combining the method and aims of the action into one word and then calling this word the principle of the will. The a posteriori drivers of the will are outlawed as part of the principle of the will as a linguistic containment of the full action. Take for example the maxim: “Preserve yourself through murder in self defense.” The a priori principle of the will could be described as: “Killing by Method,” “Preserving yourself by method,” or “Defending yourself by method.” These aims are what constitute a posteriori drivers of the will but are necessary to evaluate the moral content of Kantian scope principles of the will through linguistic play. Kant agrees with experience playing a part in these maxims as: “Admittedly experience comes into the story in a certain way, because these laws require a power of judgment that has been sharpened by experience— partly in order to pick out the cases where the laws apply and partly to let the laws get into the person’s will and to stress that they are to be acted on.” (Kant 2) This calls on the difference between assigning duties based on a priori principles of good will as the knowable full action and Kant’s interpretation. The a priori assignment of duties and Kant’s a posteri claims are contradictory to the evaluation of the principle of the will. Kant is only coherent if we allow aims of actions to be included in the principle of the will. His aims are Kantian scope; Eluetharian aims: the full knowable action. The difference in a priori and a posteri practical concepts is the difference between potential knowable effects, which you can use to assign duties, and whether the action results in those effects, or if we were to judge actions based on whether their consequences are moral or not. A simple phrasing of this to illustrate that the Kantian scope can be made into any Eleutherian scope is the example: “Taking something off the shelf at the grocery store” with the scopes: feeding myself, purchasing something, and making dinner. It is the same method that leads to all of these scopes. Taking something is the method and all of these actions can be written as Kantian scope with no contradiction. This is the Method Scope Critique. (Herman 26-30)
Cause and Effect of ELH:
The Method Scope critique leads us to try to understand the definition of activity in terms of cause and effect. The Eleutherian scope space of knowledge leads us to a different understanding of activity than Kant. Here is the cause-and-effect space of knowledge of ELH:
In the system of judgment after the action the method is the effect and the cause. This is the collective perspective. This is a perspective from perfect knowledge. The waving of my hand is the effect of the action. This means that the waving of my hand can be anything from greeting, making friends, or marrying the women I love from a backwards understanding of history. The objective and subjective causes of the method, aji, and history all come from this collective perspective. This language allows us to see the collective causes of all constructions from will and from constraints. What this perspective denies is the atomized construction of blame and credit. This is a perspective free of time.
The Moon Perspective is a determinism of sorts. It is the forward perspective of things without change. Once the will is set, containers of activity are broken and made according to the will. This is a precondition of the perspective of law and aim. The moon perspective is the perspective of the moon on the earth with regard to the sun setting and rising. The sun is continuously setting and rising from the perspective of the moon. Until there is change, the aim or path of the constraints of the laws of nature make it so that the moon sees the sun rising and setting continuously as containing the action as predicted by the cosán of physics. Cosán is the word used to describe the deductive future without change of will or law.
These two perspectives are of the same ilk. One deals with the past, the other with the future from a perspective of law and will. Both are needed in a description of cause, blame, and credit. The aim is then described from the process. All actions contain spaces so all causes from the will are space related. This makes it so that the deductive future can be formalized or simply understood through agreement of future expectation. Cosán from law is a reference to the laws that govern reality. They are the expectation that a chemical reaction or physics will always work according to scientific study and laws. The cosán of the will is the expectation of certain future methods. I call them methods due to the nature of the atomized understanding of how deductive future planning works according to the method scope critique. The cosán is changed by the method and the method becomes the cosán. This is a linear understanding of atomizing with the knowledge of the future for plans. Thus, the change of the cosán, or delta, is the knowledge of change within the scope of activity from the method. This can be a change of will, change of object, like when the tool breaks, or change of knowledge. These combine to form a sort of constant prediction of the future from knowledge of atomized description. For example, when someone tells you what is for dinner and when it is served, the cosán is set from the will of the person preparing dinner. You may have no knowledge of what the person is doing at any given moment, but the result of you eating dinner is created in being. Then, without a delta, the result is ensured from knowledge of the plan. All deductive futures work the same way. It is a bet on something being in the future. It is until there is a delta.
Cause always happens the same way. We know what the delta is from past knowledge of change and experimentation or observation. We then construct laws of what we observe to predict the future from them. This process of cosán assignment is easy to understand things that order the future from the past and is the ELHian space of knowledge of cause and effect. (Herman 30-34)
Transcendent Morality:
To better understand the conclusions of Kantian scope as the definition of activity in the metaphysical space of knowledge of The Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals one must examine the process of philosophy that I call The Categorical Definitional Method or CDM.
To create a transcendent philosophy from the definition of the good will there needs to be a division of activity. The separation into pure reason and reason marred by experience are almost two different worlds. Pure reason seems to speak to a world without failure of tactics. It speaks to an all knowing, ever adaptable, and powerful tool over nature. This world of pure will is the world of true ethical, transcendent, and powerful philosophy. ELH also speaks to this transcendent world. This transcendent world is the world of universal aims and of universal results. It is the reason behind the universal definition of good. If there were no transcendent world there would be no basis for the categorical definitional method. Kant has spoken to a priori categories as the rational will that allow us to describe this transcendent world. The categorical definitional method of The Physics of Morals also speaks to this transcendent world, but it does so not of categorical consciousness but of wavum consciousness. The difference in this world is how morality is placed into being from the process of philosophy. Kantian scope constructs a false world of the pure will. It does so by separating the a priori world and the a posteri world with a false distinction of activity. With the method scope critique, the transcendent world becomes a world of values. The difference between values and categories is the difference between abstract thinking and Kantian definition. Kant writes of tests and supreme principles; ELH speaks to aims and processes. A value of morality is good thrust into being from the transcendent philosophical method of the CDM. I called the assent into the values of the transcendent world the transcendental inductive method or TIM. The TIM operates purely of experience of words in their construction. It takes our knowledge of the word, and its usage of the word, to reach a definition of the word. This definition of the word, if done correctly, is the essence stripped of all application. It is useless until the CDM is applied. The physical realm that the value is shaped by could be from the subject, from the object, or from the agent. The TIM of good is “respect of the good willed subject.” Once a definition is created the phenomena of the definition is extracted by adding components that are your understanding and seeing how it affects the definition. This is the CDM’s use. Kant invented this form of transcendent philosophy. The Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals simply has a false premise.
The CDM of the good will is done two ways. It is done though the definition of the objective good will and our understanding of individuals with flaws. These lead us to the three spaces of knowledge of morality. The first space of knowledge is human subject. The second space of knowledge is good in the abstract. The third space of knowledge is moral effect. Kant rejects the third space of knowledge. He disregards the second space of knowledge. It is only the first space of knowledge that he regards as morality. All three spaces of knowledge of ELH come from the application of the CDM of good. The first is human good. The second is the process of moral consideration. The third is the ends and the knowledge from judge morality. All three of these spaces of knowledge are needed to form a moral opinion.
Conclusion:
The spaces of knowledge of virtue ethics, utilitarianism, and Kantian deontology. All are varied and lacked the fusion that Eleutherian Hermanism achieves through the universal definition of good. Virtue ethic aims at a hitobhian construction of ethical theory but fails to have a universal aim. It doesn't describe what good is analytically and from the atom. Utilitarianism is a serviceable judge morality but imposes good on the subject when they are free to choose their own preference. It is a hedonism that only serves our basic instincts. Kantian deontology has the correct method of proving morality but relies on a false premise. It describes the transcendent world of pure morals from the rigid use of categories rather than the wavum use of values. All three of these ethical systems contain glimpses into what ELH tries to accomplish.
Bibliography:
Aristotle, et al. Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. University of Chicago Press, 2012.
Bentham, Jeremy. The Principles of Morals and Legislation. Prometheus Books, 1988.
Herman, Lewis. The Physics of Morals. Kindle Direct Publishing, 2023.
Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork for the Metaphysic of Morals, www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/kant1785.pdf. Accessed 21 Dec. 2023.
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Eleutherian Hermanism and Major Ethical Theories
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